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Abstract 
 
The Texas Education Agency (TEA) performs extensive reviews of audit working papers for 
selected Texas school district audits to evaluate the quality of audit services rendered by 
independent accountants. These reviews are referred to as Quality Control Reviews (QCRs). The 
TEA also conducts desk reviews of all audited financial statements issued by Texas independent 
school districts. During the desk review process, the TEA performs a limited check of the accuracy 
of financial statement amounts, completeness of financial disclosures, and existence of proper 
audit output. Prior research suggests that desk reviews and quality control reviews both measure 
audit quality (Colbert and O’Keefe 1995; Copley et al. 1994; Deis and Giroux 1992, 1996; 
Giroux et al. 1995; O’Keefe and Westort 1992; O’Keefe et al. 1994). The purpose of the paper is 
to determine if desk reviews capture the same audit quality information as quality control reviews. 
If so, regulators should focus resources on desk reviews since they are more timely and 
economical than QCRs. The results of the study, however, indicate that desk reviews and quality 
control reviews do not measure the same constructs. The findings suggest that desk reviews 
measure the industry specific knowledge of the auditor, which is only one aspect of audit quality. 
Moreover, it was observed that some audits passing the desk review were graded low in quality by 
the working paper review. This finding suggests that low audit quality may be more prevalent than 
generally suspected and that steps to improve audit quality and auditor credibility are warranted. 
 
 
Introduction 
 
 A string of recent accounting failures (e.g., Enron, WorldCom, Cendant: Waste Management) has increased 
the scrutiny of public accounting firms. On December 2, 2001, Enron filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy without any 
warnings from its Big 5 auditor, Arthur Andersen. In another failure, Cendant‟s shareholders filed a lawsuit accusing 
its independent auditor of providing a “clean” audit opinion without gathering adequate documentation and without 
reviewing company general ledgers (Pachelle and MacDonald 1999). Such instances shake financial statement user 
faith in the credibility of the auditor and the accounting profession. Based on recent auditing debacles, it is evident 
that substandard audit reports can be prepared without performing necessary audit procedures. In fact, various audit 
resources (e.g., sample reports, industry guidelines, reporting software) make it possible to conduct an audit and 
prepare an audit report with minimal effort. In the private sector, the need for independent measures of audit quality 
is evident.  
 
 In an effort to improve audit quality, perhaps the profession can look to solutions developed in the 
governmental auditing arena. This study investigates two specific audit quality measures used to evaluate the audits 
of independent school districts.  Regulators have used two types of reviews to assess the auditor‟s compliance with 
GAAS and GAGAS: (1) desk reviews and (2) working paper reviews. Since the two reviews differ in scope and 
purpose, their relationship and appropriate use is unclear. The purpose of this study is to determine if desk reviews 
capture the same audit quality information as working paper reviews.  
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 Extant research concentrates on the following three indicators of audit service supply: (1) audit hours, (2) 
compliance with generally accepted reporting standards as evidenced in desk reviews of audit reports, and (3) 
compliance with generally accepted auditing standards as determined in working paper reviews (i.e., quality control 
reviews or “QCRs”). None of these measures is a perfect indicator of the quality of audit supply, and each may 
capture unique aspects of the supply of audit services. Audit hours can, for example, be considerable in absolute 
terms but can be used inefficiently.  In addition, required procedures may be omitted, and the audit reports can be 
incorrectly prepared. Following GAAS reporting guidelines results in a “clean” desk review, but meeting reporting 
requirements can be accomplished even if the underlying audit work is substandard. Finally, collections of fieldwork 
evidence (i.e., working papers) do not always translate into high quality audit reports.  The quality of audit reports is 
also influenced by the methods used to synthesize evidence and independence issues (e.g., the auditor‟s willingness 
to report sensitive matters). To develop a better view of audit service supply, this paper considers all three audit 
service supply metrics in unison.  
 
 The data used in this study contains 178 audits of independent school districts in Texas on which state 
auditors in the oversight agency conducted both a desk review and QCR. Actual total audit hours for each audit were 
also available. Data analysis revealed that reports meeting generally accepted reporting standards sometimes mask 
low quality audit work and that, occasionally, audits that collected adequate audit evidence were found to have 
reporting violations. Such flaws in the audit process point to potential threats to auditor credibility. Results also 
indicate that desk reviews and quality control reviews do not measure the same aspects of audit service supply. Desk 
reviews appeared to capture the industry-specific knowledge of the auditor. All findings were confirmed using both 
ordinary least squares regression and simultaneous equations analysis.  
 
Background 
 
As a result of the Single Audit Act of 1984, the Department of Education now monitors the quality of audits 
of public school districts. In Texas, the authority to review audits of independent school districts (ISDs) has been 
delegated to the Texas Education Agency (TEA). The regulatory actions of the TEA have provided researchers with 
an independent assessment of audit quality. The Texas Education Agency (TEA) performs extensive reviews of audit 
working papers for selected Texas school district audits in order to measure audit quality. These reviews are referred 
to as Quality Control Reviews (QCRs). The TEA also conducts desk reviews of all audited financial statements 
issued by Texas independent school districts. During the desk review process, the TEA performs a limited check of 
the accuracy of financial statement amounts, completeness of financial disclosures, and existence of proper audit 
output. 
 
In the private sector, proxies for audit quality are difficult to construct. The surrogate used in most prior 
research has been audit firm size. According to DeAngelo (1981b), large auditors perform better quality audits 
because they have many clients and would lose more quasi-rents than smaller firms if they provided poor quality 
audits. In addition, large auditors are more independent from their clients because each client‟s fee is only a small 
percentage of the auditor‟s total revenues. In the public sector, the TEA develops a reliable ex-post measure of audit 
quality for school districts.  
 
 Several studies have used state agency data to examine the determinants of audit quality, audit fees and 
audit hours for public school district audits. The results have been consistent between the two different audit quality 
measures that have been developed to date. The three Texas school district studies (Deis and Giroux 1992, 1996; 
Giroux et al. 1995) used an audit quality metric developed from quality control review (QCR) letters prepared by the 
TEA. O‟Keefe et al. (1994) used desk reviews prepared by the California State Controller‟s Office to create the 
second quality measure.
1
 The current study uses both desk review and working paper review (QCR) data to more 
thoroughly examine the supply of audit services. The purpose of the paper is to determine if desk reviews capture the 
same audit quality information as QCR.  
 
An important question for regulators is whether desk reviews and QCRs are redundant measures of audit 
quality. Many audits in the public sector are of low quality and do not conform to GAAS (US GAO 1986). As a 
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result, it is essential that some formal review process be conducted to promote quality financial reporting by 
governmental units. The TEA could, however, significantly reduce public spending if performing only desk reviews 
would accomplish the monitoring goals set by the Department of Education. On the other hand, if desk reviews 
measure different aspects of quality than QCRs, it may be necessary to retain both desk reviews and QCRs, or even 
expand the QCR program. 
 
 This research uses the audit quality and audit hours models developed in Deis and Giroux (1992, 1996) and 
Giroux et al. (1995). Also, the database used in the above studies is further developed with the addition of a new 
metric for desk reviews. The findings of O‟Keefe et al. (1994) (the only other study with detailed desk review data), 
suggest that the desk score variable will yield results very similar to those found for QCR score in Deis and Giroux 
(1996) and Giroux et al. (1995). Consistent results for desk reviews and QCRs would indicate that both scores 
measure very similar audit quality characteristics. One of the key advantages of the current study is that the database 
allows for a direct comparison of desk reviews, QCRs, and audit hours. 
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a discussion of prior research 
on school district audits. The following sections discuss the models and methods used in the study. Last, the results 
of tests performed and concluding remarks are presented. 
 
Prior Research 
 
 In the late 1970‟s, many cities experienced financial difficulties coupled with inadequate financial records. 
The unexpected crisis in New York City and other cities led to passage of the Single Audit Act of 1984 in order to 
improve the quality of audits and financial reporting of governmental units. Among other provisions, the Single 
Audit Act requires desk reviews and quality control reviews for Independent School Districts (ISD) (Deis et al. 
1990). These reviews have been used to monitor audit quality. At the Texas State level, the Department of Education 
has delegated reviewing authority to the Texas Education Agency (TEA). Desk reviews performed by the TEA are 
preliminary reviews of all audited financial statements issued by Texas ISDs. In the desk review, TEA auditors check 
that certain financial statement amounts are accurate, that financial disclosures are complete, that the report was filed 
on a timely basis, and that correct opinion format was used.  
 
Problems that are discovered in the desk review phase could cause the TEA to perform a quality control 
review of the auditor. In such a review, the agency examines the auditor‟s working papers. To date, QCRs are 
performed for only a limited number of audits, although the TEA intends to expand the program to include all audits 
(Deis et al. 1990). Auditors may be chosen for a QCR on a regional basis or as a result of a desk review. QCRs are 
much more comprehensive than desk reviews and focus on evaluating whether auditor‟s working papers indicate the 
proper application of GAAS and GAGAS procedures. When QCRs suggest that audits are of particularly low 
quality, the TEA can refer the auditor to the Texas State Board of Accountancy for disciplinary action (Deis et al. 
1990). 
 
 Previous studies have primarily used the results of quality control reviews to test audit quality theories. 
Using TEA data, three studies analyzed relationships between audit quality, audit fees and audit hours. Deis and 
Giroux (1992) developed a quality metric for 232 ISD audits from QCR letters of findings sent to the auditors. Prior 
research of commercial firms has shown that reputation differences and power conflicts are valid explanations for 
differences in audit quality between small and large auditors (see e.g., DeAngelo 1981b; Nichols and Price 1976; 
Rubin 1988). The purpose of the Deis and Giroux study was to determine if these factors explained variations in 
audit quality for a homogeneous group of auditors (i.e., small auditors of Texas ISDs). Panel A of Table 1 
summarizes the results of their study.  
 
 The following variables were used in the three Texas school district studies. These variables deserve some 
explanation because they are also included in the present study. All of the variables described below are statistically 
significant in Deis and Giroux (1992). In the model, increases in auditor tenure result in decreases in audit quality, a 
result consistent with private sector research (see e.g., Francis and Simon 1987; Turpen 1990). This finding is also 
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consistent with DeAngelo‟s (1981b) quasi-rent theory, which states that an auditor decreases audit quality over time 
(by not reporting all deficiencies) in order to retain the client and receive future fees. Audit quality was found to 
increase with increases in the number of ISD clients of an auditor (see also, Shockley 1982). An auditor with many 
ISD clients has more industry expertise and does not want to damage its reputation with poor quality audits.  
 
The variable PEER measures whether the auditor is a member of the AICPA Peer Review Section. Auditors 
that are members provide higher quality audits because they commit to higher professional standards and can better 
resist client pressures. In a later study, Giroux et al. (1995) documented that participation in peer reviews was also 
associated with increased audit fees. It appears that firms that voluntarily join peer review programs are signaling 
commitment to the profession. They provide higher quality audits for higher fees. The study did not find an 
association between peer review membership and audit hours.  
 
As client size and client wealth increase, audit quality decreases. The power-conflict explanation of this 
relationship is that larger, wealthier clients can more easily influence audit results. TIME measures when the TEA 
receives an audit report. Less timely and late reports are associated with lower quality. The last significant variable in 
the model is HOURS (the actual hours spent to perform an audit). As hours increase, audit quality increases. This is 
consistent with the proposition that auditors expend more effort on higher quality audits. Deis and Giroux interpret 
these results based on theories of reputation and power-conflict. Their study‟s results confirm that both of these 
explanations for differing audit qualities for small versus large audit firms are also valid for a homogeneous group of 
small auditors.  
 
 Deis and Giroux (1996) further analyzed the TEA data. The purpose of the study was to determine what 
effect initial audits had on audit quality, audit fees and audit hours (see Table 1, Panels A and B). Most variables in 
the quality model are the same as those in Deis and Giroux (1992). A variable was added (YEAR 1) to distinguish 
between initial and subsequent audits. The study found a significant relationship between YEAR1 and QCR scores, 
where initial engagements produced higher audit quality. Initial engagements were also associated with lower fees 
and higher audit hours (see Table 1, Panel B). These results support DeAngelo‟s (1981a) low-balling hypothesis. 
Auditors price initial audits at a discount in order to capture the future profits associated with new clients - even 
though more hours are required to perform first year audits (Francis and Simon 1987; Simon and Francis 1988; 
Turpen 1990). Once a client chooses an auditor, the costs associated with switching to a new auditor are very high. 
In addition, the auditor will earn profits in future years because less audit hours will be required as a result of the 
learning curve. Auditors provide high quality for initial audits because they do not want to jeopardize this future 
profit potential. The results of Deis and Giroux extend private sector low-balling theories to the public auditing 
sector. 
 
 A study by O‟Keefe, King and Gaver (1994) used desk review results to test audit quality theories very 
similar to the three TEA studies mentioned above. The quality metric was based on desk reviews performed by the 
California State Controller‟s Office. The controller‟s office reviews the financial statements and audit reports of 
school districts to check compliance with GAAS and GAAP standards. Review results are sent to the school districts 
and the auditors. The study analyzed reviews of 935 reports for the year 1986. The purpose of the study was to 
determine if compliance with GAAS increases with increased labor (where audit fees were used as a proxy for labor) 
and with increased industry specialization of the auditor (number of ISD clients). Panel A of Table 1 compares the 
desk review results with the results of the TEA studies. Consistent with Deis and Giroux (1992, 1996), O‟Keefe et al. 
found that an increase in the number of school district audits decreased the number of violations of GAAS and, 
therefore, increased audit quality. Similarly, fewer violations were associated with higher audit fees. Audit fees proxy 
for the amount of labor and effort expended to perform the audit. Audit quality should improve as effort increases 
because of the greater likelihood of identifying material misstatements in the financial statements and of properly 
following GAAS regulations. In general, the results of O‟Keefe et al. were consistent with the TEA studies. 
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Effect on Quality Effect on Quality Effect on Quality Variables 
as Variable as Variable as Variable in all models
Increases Increases Increases proxy for:
TENURE decreases YEAR1 increases CPA_CHANGE increases initial audit
CLIENTS increases CLIENTS increases #SD_AUDITS increases industry knowledge
PEER increases PEER increases CPA_SOCIETY increases peer review
SIZE decreases SIZE decreases CLIENT_REVENUE decreases size of ISD
WEALTH decreases WEALTH decreases
TIME decreases TIME decreases
HOURS increases HOURS increases AUDIT FEE increases labor
OFFICES increases BIG8 increases brand name
     +HOURS
VIOLATIONS=TIER2+BIG8+CPA_CHANGE+#SD_AUDITS+CPA_SOCIETY+DIVISION_FIRM
     +CLIENT_REVENUE+AUDIT_FEE+PREV_PROBLEMS+WEAK_CONTROLS
AUDIT FEE AND HOUR MODELS
Deis and Giroux 1996
Effect on Fees Effect on Hours
as Variable as Variable
Increases Increases
YEAR1 decreases increases
CLIENTS decreases decreases
SIZE increases increases
OFFICES increases increases
CAFR increases increases
ICREPORT increases increases
OPIN increases increases
PCI decreases decreases
QUALITY increases increases
Variables listed above are statistically significant variables.
Full model:
Deis and Giroux 1996
FEE or HOURS=YEAR1+YEAR2+CLIENTS+SIZE+OFFICES+CAFR+ICREPORTS+OPIN+PCI
      +QUALITY
Panel A
Panel B
O'Keefe et al. 1994
O'Keefe et al. 1994
AUDIT QUALITY MODELS
Deis and Giroux 1992 Deis and Giroux 1996
Variables listed above are statistically significant variables.
Full models:
Deis and Giroux 1992
Ln(QUALITY)=TENURE+CLIENTS+PEER+BOARD+SIZE+WEALTH+YEAR+REPORT+TIME
Deis and Giroux 1996
Ln(QUALITY)=YEAR1+YEAR2+CLIENTS+PEER+SIZE+WEALTH+TIME+HOURS+OFFICES
 
Table 1: Summary Results Of Audit Quality And Fee 
Studies  For Independent School Districts PROPOSITIONS 
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 The results of O‟Keefe et al. (1994) begin to suggest that desk reviews capture much of the same audit 
quality information as quality control reviews. If desk reviews did measure the same aspects of audit quality as 
QCRs, then the quality control review process would be redundant, and considerable public funds could be saved by 
eliminating the QCR process. The question is particularly relevant given that the TEA is considering the 
implementation of QCRs for every Texas school district. 
 
 The problem with basing any policy decisions on the O‟Keefe et al. (1994) study is that no direct 
comparison was made between QCRs and desk reviews. The study found that desk review scores were positively 
associated with audit fees and the number of ISD clients held by the auditor. These results do not offer convincing 
evidence that desk reviews capture full audit quality information. For example, if the desk review score captured 
information about the industry expertise of the auditor, we would expect to find very similar results. More expertise 
would be associated with auditors that have many school district clients, and more expertise would result in a 
demand by the auditor for higher fees. 
 
We propose that desk reviews do not capture the same audit quality information as QCRs. Desk reviews are 
based on the content and format of the audited financial statements, and no analysis of audit working papers is 
involved (TEA 1994a). The desk review process may produce information relating to the skill of the auditor, which 
is associated with audit quality, but will not reveal the quality of the audit itself. 
 
Proposition 1. The determinants of desk reviews will not be the same as described for quality control reviews by 
Deis and Giroux (1996) and Giroux et al. (1995). 
 
Proposition 2. The desk review score will be a reliable predictor of QCR score. 
 
O‟Keefe et al. used audit fees as a proxy for measuring audit labor. They found that increased quality, as 
measured by desk review score, was associated with higher audit fees. This association supported their prediction 
that desk reviews measured audit quality. In this study, we use a direct measure of audit labor – the actual number of 
hours spent on the audit by the auditor. We propose that the desk review score is not capturing the same audit quality 
information as a quality control review. Rather, desk review scores likely measure some aspect of auditor expertise. 
 
As a result, desk review scores will not be related to the level of labor input to the audit process, as 
measured by actual audit hours. 
 
Proposition 3. Desk review scores will not have a positive and significant association with audit hours. 
 
Models and Methods 
 
 TEA response letters written to ISDs were analyzed to develop a desk review metric. The response letters 
describe the results of the individual desk reviews. Table 2 shows the categories of the deficiencies reported in desk 
review letters and the frequency count associated with each deficiency. Deficiencies include errors in financial 
statements and auditor related errors. Errors in financial statements addressed by the TEA in the review letters 
included only the errors not reported in the audit reports. We located 181 of the 232 audit reports used in the Deis 
and Giroux (1996) and Giroux et al. (1995) studies and categorized each deficiency in the 181 desk review letters. A 
detailed description of the types of violations included under each category can be requested from the authors.  
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Table 2: Desk Review Scoring 
 
 Desk Review    Deficiency Assigned   
 Score Items   Severity Weight Frequency Percent* 
         
Late filing of audit report    Major 2 7 1.27% 
Certificate of Board    Minor 1 8 1.45% 
Errors in auditor-supplied information      
 Missing required disclosure or schedule Major 2 47 8.53% 
 Auditor-specific errors   Minor 1 4 0.73% 
Budget         
 Legal procedures not followed  Minor 1 33 5.99% 
 Incorrect reporting   Major 2 66 11.98% 
Financial Statements        
 Incorrect classifications  Major 2 42 7.62% 
 Disagreement between schedules and F/S  Minor 1 44 7.99% 
 Incomplete or missing disclosures  Minor 1 4 0.73% 
 Incorrect reporting procedures   Major 2 3 0.54% 
 Legal compliance problems   Major 2 117 21.23% 
Notes to F/S        
 Missing F/S notes    Major 2 21 3.81% 
 Missing disclosures within reported notes  Minor 1 24 4.36% 
 Disagreement between notes and F/S Minor 1 15 2.72% 
Special Schedules        
 Incorrect classifications   Minor 1 1 0.18% 
 Incomplete or missing disclosures Minor 1 9 1.63% 
 Incorrect reporting procedures   Minor 1 3 0.54% 
Missing F/S    Extreme 3 9 1.63% 
Missing schedules    Major 2 20 3.63% 
Improper format in schedule or statement   Minor 1 17 3.09% 
Math errors     Minor 1 38 6.90% 
Prior years‟ deficiencies repeated in current year  Major 2 19 3.45% 
         
  Total number of deficiencies found in the 181 reports 551  
         
*Percent of the total number of deficiencies (551)     
 
 
 The categories of deficiencies in Table 2 are classified into minor, major and extreme deficiencies. 
Classification of deficiencies was based upon interviews with the TEA, analysis of the TEA desk review checklist 
and audit review manual, and examination of the TEA criteria for the referral of desk reviews for quality control 
reviews (TEA 1994a,b). The extreme deficiency category includes items that would automatically cause the referral 
of an audit for a QCR. The extreme deficiency category is weighted three times more severe than the minor 
deficiency category due to the TEA‟s perceived gravity of the violations.2 Major deficiencies are assigned two times 
more weight than minor deficiencies. Major deficiencies were those identified by the TEA that would warrant 
referral for a QCR if multiple violations were present. The desk review metric is initiated by summing the weighed 
deficiencies for each school district multiplied by minus 1. The resulting index ranged from 0 to minus 17. The 
dependent variable DESKSCORE was constructed by adding 18 to the desk review index and dividing the result by 
18 as follows: 
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DESKSCORE =  
(Desk Review Weighted Index +  18)
18
 
 
The result is a variable with values from 0 to 1. Higher (lower) DESKSCORE values indicate less (more) violations 
detected in the desk review process. 
 
 The procedure to construct the metric for audit service quality found in the QCR was similar to that used to 
develop DESKREVIEW. As described by Deis and Giroux (1992, 468-469), 19 categories of deficiencies in the 
audit were drawn from TEA‟s letters of findings (see Table 3). TEA‟s Director of Audits ranked the deficiencies in 
order of importance to the decision to refer the audit to the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy for possible 
sanctions. To construct the metric in this study, the most important items were ranked minus 19 and the least 
important was weighed minus 1. By summing these items for each audit, a weighed index of QCR findings was 
constructed. This index ranged from minus 1 to minus 131. The dependent variable, QCRSCORE, was constructed 
by adding the weighed QCR index to 132 and then dividing the result by 132 as follows: 
 
QCRSCORE =  
(QCR Weighted Index +  132)
132
 
 
 The resulting metric ranges between 0 and 1. High (low) values for the QCRSCORE indicate high (low) 
levels of violations found in the working paper review.  
 
 One advantage of the two audit quality metrics is that they are both on a scale ranging from 0 to 1. 
Moreover, they can be interpreted as probability ratios of the quality of audit service supplied. A plot of 
DESKSCORE and QCRSCORE appears in Figure 1. DESKSCORE is plotted on the vertical axis. QCRSCORE is 
plotted along the horizontal axis. The referral outcome was used as a symbol to plot each observation (1 = referred 
and 0 = not referred). The figure shows a number of interesting phenomena. First, a number of high DESKSCORE 
audits have a low QCRSCORE (upper left part of the figure). Most of these high DESKSCORE/low QCRSCORE 
observations were referred to the State Board for sanctions. This is an example of “window dressing” (reports in 
proper format but without adequate underlying audit evidence and documentation to support the audit report). 
Second, a number of low DESKSCORE audits have a high QCRSCORE (lower right part of the figure). None of 
these audits were referred to the State Board. It appears that the referral decision is influenced more by the results of 
the QCR than the desk review.  
 
 The three propositions stated earlier are investigated using two audit quality models and an audit hours 
model similar to those used in prior literature (Deis and Giroux 1992 and 1996; Giroux et al. 1995). Two types of 
analysis are conducted first using ordinary least-squares regression (OLS) and then using simultaneous equations 
analysis where the audit service supply and audit quality constructs are jointly estimated. The three OLS models used 
in this study follow.  
 
Audit Quality Models 
 
DESKSCORE = 0 + 1SIZE + 2WEALTH + 3CLIENTS + 4OFFICES + 5PEER + 6TIME + 7HOURS + 
8YEAR1 + 1 
QCRSCORE = 0 + 1SIZE + 2WEALTH + 3CLIENTS + 4OFFICES + 5PEER + 6TIME + 7HOURS + 
8YEAR1 + 9DESKSCORE + 2 
 
Audit Hours Model 
 
HOURS = 0 + 1SIZE + 2PCI + 3OFFICES + 4CLIENTS + 5CAFR +  
6ICREPORTS + 7OPIN + 8YEAR1 + 9DESKSCORE + 10QCRSCORE + 3 
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Figure 1 Plot of DESKSCORE and QCRSCORE 
 
 DESKSCORE ‚ 
  ‚ 
  1.0000 ˆ                  1     1                   00  000 00 00  0 0 
  ‚ 
  0.9444 ˆ                                    0      00 00 0  000 0 
  ‚ 
  0.8889 ˆ                   1  1            1     001   1000 00000 00 
  ‚ 
  0.8333 ˆ                                  0      0  0 0  0  0  00 0 
  ‚ 
  0.7778 ˆ                             0 1         0  0 000 0000 00 
  ‚ 
  0.7222 ˆ            1        1     1  1  0         00  0 000 0 00 00 0 
  ‚ 
  0.6667 ˆ                1                        1     0000 0  000 
  ‚ 
  0.6111 ˆ                   1  1                 0 000      0   0 0 0 
  ‚ 
  0.5556 ˆ                                 1   0       0    0 0      0 
  ‚ 
  0.5000 ˆ             1        1              1     0 0   00 00 
  ‚ 
  0.4444 ˆ                                          0 000 000  0  0 
  ‚ 
  0.3889 ˆ                     1                 0 0    00 0 
  ‚ 
  0.3333 ˆ                                                     0 0 
  ‚ 
  0.2778 ˆ 
  ‚ 
  0.2222 ˆ                                               0    0 
  ‚ 
  0.1667 ˆ 
  ‚ 
  0.1111 ˆ                                              0 
  ‚ 
  0.0556 ˆ                   1 
        ‚ 
         Šƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒƒˆƒ 
          0.0         0.2         0.4         0.6         0.8         1.0 
 
                                     QCRSCORE 
 
NOTE: 43 obs hidden. Audit firms referred to Texas State Board of Public Accountancy are indicated by “1” and “0”  if audit 
was not referred.  
 
The variables in the models have the following definitions. 
DESKSCORE: desk review score ranging from 0 (low) to 1 (high) 
QCRSCORE: metric for audit quality based on QCRs ranging from 0 (low) to 1 (high) 
SIZE: log of average daily attendance for the ISD 
WEALTH: log of property values per student 
CLIENTS: number of school district clients of the auditor 
OFFICES: number of offices owned by the audit firm 
PEER: 1 if audit firm is a member of AICPA‟s Peer Review Section, 0 otherwise 
TIME: number of days from fiscal year end (8/31) until the date of the audit report divided by 120 (school districts have until 
12/31, 120 days from 8/31, to submit the annual report) 
HOURS: log of actual hours required in performing the audit 
YEAR1: 1 if the audit is a first year audit of the client, 0 otherwise 
PCI: log of per capita income in the school district 
CAFR: 1 if audit report was a Comprehensive Annual Financial Report, 0 otherwise (i.e., General Purpose Financial Statements) 
ICREPORT: 1 if auditor reported material weaknesses in internal controls, 0 otherwise 
OPIN: 1 if a qualified independent auditor‟s report is issued, 0 otherwise 
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Table 3 QCR Scoring 
 
QCR Deficiency Item Assigned 
Weight 
Freq. Percent* 
Audit Program: Major -19 17 2.31% 
Working Papers: Major -18 3 0.41% 
Legal Compliance: Major -17 45 6.12% 
Audit Procedures: Major -16 31 4.22% 
Internal Control: Major -15 12 1.63% 
No Management Representation Letter -14 25 3.40% 
Substantive Tests: Major -13 17 2.31% 
Errors in Financial Statement Presentation -12 63 8.57% 
Ethics Violations -11 2 0.27% 
Legal Compliance: Minor -10 45 6.12% 
Errors In Audit Report -9 20 2.72% 
Inadequate Risk Assessment -8 97 13.20% 
Inadequate Statistical Sampling -7 118 16.05% 
No Engagement Letter -6 27 3.67% 
Audit Program: Minor -5 12 1.63% 
Audit Procedures: Minor -4 105 14.29% 
Working Papers: Minor -3 56 7.62% 
Internal Control: Minor -2 28 3.81% 
Substantive Tests: Minor -1 12 1.63% 
    
Total number of deficiencies found in 178 reports 735  
*Percent of the total number of deficiencies (735)   
 
 
 The audit quality models and hours model are analyzed using OLS regression. This study uses the database 
used in Deis and Giroux (1992 & 1996) and Giroux et al. (1995) with the additional variable, DESKSCORE. Using 
the same database allows for direct comparison of QCR scores and desk review scores. The sample consists of 181 
ISDs and audit reports for fiscal years 1986 and 1987. As in the previous studies, Big 8 and regional audit firms were 
not included in the sample to eliminate any “brand name” bias associated with these firms. Also, each school district 
is represented only once in the sample (Deis and Giroux, 1996).  
 
Table 4 presents descriptive statistics of the key variables. The average desk review variable 
(DESKSCORE) is 0.72 with a range from 0.06 to 1.00. In comparison, the average QCR review variable 
(QCRSCORE) was 0.76 and ranged from 0.01 to 0.99. Both scales are similar with a “passing” average in the 70 th 
percentile. The ranges are quite large for both, however, indicating a wide variety in performance. The initial sample 
included 181 school district desk reviews. Three observations resulted in extreme outliers in the regression models. 
These observations were removed from all analyses due to their potential influence on the regression estimations. 
The final sample consists of 178 observations. 
 
Results 
 
 Table 5 presents the Pearson Correlation Coefficients for selected variables. The majority of the 
independent variables do not have strong correlations, with the exception of HOURS and SIZE (0.63). The 
DESKSCORE and the QCRSCORE variables have a correlation of only 0.16. Preliminary analyses appear to 
indicate that these two variables are proxies for different constructs. 
 
 To investigate the first proposition, which suggests that DESKSCORE captures different audit quality 
characteristics relative to QCRs, the original Deis and Giroux (1996) model with DESKSCORE as the dependent 
variable was utilized. Table 6 shows the results for the audit quality model.
3
 The model is statistically significant, 
and the R
2
 is 0.110. WEALTH, OFFICES, PEER, TIME, and HOURS are not significant. YEAR1 is significant, but 
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has the opposite sign of YEAR1 in Deis and Giroux (1996, 76) (see Table 1). If the audit is an initial audit (YEAR1 
= 1) then DESKSCORE decreases. This suggests that initial audits conform less to GAAS reporting standards than 
repeat engagements. One explanation for this result is that DESKSCORE measures a different characteristic of 
quality than the QCR, such as the industry and client specific knowledge of the auditor. Client specific knowledge 
would necessarily be lower for new clients. The significant relation between number of ISD clients and 
DESKSCORE also suggests that desk reviews capture the industry and client specific knowledge of the auditor.  
 
  The second proposition concerns the ability of DESKSCORE to predict audit quality as measured by 
QCRSCORE. To test for this relation, DESKSCORE was introduced as an additional independent variable to the 
Deis and Giroux (1996) model of the determinants of audit quality (see Table 7). DESKSCORE is a significant 
predictor of QCR score at the .01 level. Based on this result and the sign of YEAR1 in Table 6, it appears that 
DESKSCORE is measuring industry specific and/or client specific knowledge of the auditor, which would be 
positively related to audit quality. During initial audits, auditors know very little about the client (and possibly about 
the industry) which would result in a low DESKSCORE.  
 
Audit hours increased with higher quality scores in Deis and Giroux (1996) and were predicted to increase 
with higher quality as measured with desk review scores by O‟Keefe et al. (1994). We find in Table 6, however, that 
audit hours are not a positive and significant determinant of DESKSCORE.
4
 As auditors input more labor to the 
audit process, the desk review score does not improve. This indicates that the desk review score is determined by 
knowledge that is in place prior to the audit, and increased auditor effort does not affect the score. The finding 
supports the proposition that DESKSCORE measures only one aspect of audit quality, namely client/industry 
specific knowledge. 
 
 
Table 4 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable Mean*  (Frequency) Range 
   
SIZE (log of average daily attendance) 3,994 36 to 44,776 
WEALTH (log of property tax base per student) 243,600 21,979 to 5,404,050 
CLIENTS (number of ISD clients) 3.32 1 to 21 
OFFICES (number of offices for audit firm) 1.30 1 to 8 
PEER (1 = audit firm member of AICPA‟s Peer 
Review Program, 0 otherwise) 
(0 = 151, 1 = 27) 0 to 1 
TIME (portion of 120 days after yearend to file audit 
report with TEA) 
0.63 0.15 to 1.61 
HOURS (log of actual audit hours) 298 38 to 1,610 
YEAR1 (1 = first year engagement, 0 otherwise) (0 = 168, 1 = 13) 0 to 1 
PCI (log of per capita income) 6,251 2,642 to 12,827 
CAFR (1 = CAFR , 0 otherwise) (0 = 159, 1 = 19) 0 to 1 
ICRREPORT (1 = reported weaknesses in internal 
control, 0 otherwise) 
(0 = 100, 1 = 78) 0 to 1 
TENURE (tenure of the auditor) 10.28 1 to 40 
QCR Index** (sum of deficiencies found in QCR) -37 -131 to -1 
DESK Index (sum of deficiencies found in desk 
review) 
-5 -17 to 0 
QCRSCORE (based on QCR Index) 0.76 0.01 to 0.99 
DESKSCORE (based on Desk Index) 0.72 0.06 to 1.00 
*Means and ranges are for true values, not log values. 
**QCR Index is the metric used in the prior TEA studies (e.g., Deis and Giroux 1992 & 1996). 
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Table 5:  Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
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DESKSCORE 1.00
QCRSCORE 0.16 1.00
SIZE 0.15 0.07 1.00
WEALTH 0.02 -0.23 -0.32 1.00
CLIENTS 0.20 0.19 0.20 -0.11 1.00
OFFICES 0.11 0.20 0.10 -0.10 0.30 1.00
PEER -0.10 0.23 0.19 -0.14 0.09 0.01 1.00
TIME -0.14 -0.19 -0.03 0.00 -0.26 -0.04 -0.08 1.00
HOURS 0.02 0.27 0.63 -0.22 0.08 0.16 0.15 0.10 1.00
YEAR1 -0.21 0.14 -0.04 -0.04 0.00 -0.08 -0.06 0.12 0.05 1.00
 
 
 
Table 6 Audit Quality Model Based on Desk Reviews 
(Dependent variable: DESKSCORE) 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted Sign1 Regression Coefficient T-statistic2 
    
INTERCEPT  0.424 1.356 
SIZE - 0.024 1.701 
WEALTH - 0.021 0.962 
CLIENTS + 0.008 1.734** 
OFFICES + 0.009 0.640 
PEER + 0.033 0.766 
TIME - -0.001 -0.833 
HOURS + -0.024 -0.876 
YEAR1 + -0.142 -2.417*** 
     R-square = .110    
     F-value = 2.600**    
1Predictions according to Deis and Giroux (1996, 72) model 
2Significant at the *.10 level; **.05 level; ***.01 level 
 
 
Deis and Giroux (1996, 69) developed a model of audit hours to investigate the determinants of auditor 
effort. They found that QCRSCORE was related to audit hours, and suggested that the differences in audit quality 
measured by QCR scores measured product differentiation in the audit market. That is, for audits to be of high 
quality, auditors had to expend more effort. We replicate their model adding DESKSCORE (along with 
QCRSCORE) to measure product differentiation (Table 8). In this study, DESKSCORE is not a significant predictor 
of audit hours. Again, desk reviews do not seem to capture the differences in audit quality that are measured by 
QCRs.  
 
 Because there is a potential simultaneous equation bias among the DESKSCORE, QCRSCORE, and 
HOURS models, the three equations were jointly estimated using the three-stage least squares approach. To keep the 
three-equation system from being over-identified, the equations vary slightly from the OLS models. The three-
equation system that was jointly estimated is as follows:  
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DESKSCORE = 10 + 11SIZE + 12WEALTH + 13CLIENTS + 14OFFICES + 15CAFR + 16PEER + 17TIME + 
18HOURS + 19YEAR1 + 11HOURS + 12QCRSCORE + 11. 
 
 
Table 7 Audit Quality Model Based On Working Paper Reviews 
(Dependent variable: QCRSCORE) 
 
Variable 
 
Predicted Sign1 Regression Coefficient T-statistic2 
    
INTERCEPT  1.099 3.789*** 
SIZE - -0.046 -3.483*** 
WEALTH - -0.059 -2.922*** 
CLIENTS + 0.004 0.912 
OFFICES + 0.024 1.731** 
PEER + 0.105 2.643*** 
TIME - -0.002 -2.842*** 
HOURS + 0.109 4.365*** 
YEAR1 + 0.142 2.581*** 
DESKSCORE  0.170 2.391*** 
    
adj. R-square = .291    
F-value = 7.648***    
1Predictions other than DESKSCORE according to Deis and Giroux (1996, 72) model 
2Significant at the *.10 level; **.05 level; ***.01 level 
 
 
Table 8 Audit Hours Model (Dependent variable: Log of Actual Audit Hours) 
 
Variable Predicted Sign1 Regression Coefficient T-statistic2 
    
INTERCEPT  4.709 3.078*** 
SIZE + 0.314 10.402*** 
PCI - -0.240 -1.405* 
OFFICES + 0.072 1.821** 
CLIENTS - -0.022 -1.845** 
CAFR + 0.318 2.300** 
ICREPORT + 0.128 1.462* 
OPIN + 0.236 1.269 
YEAR1 + 0.115 0.711 
DESKSCORE - -0.214 -1.011 
QCR + 0.744 3.673*** 
    
R-square = .511    
F-value = 17.455***    
1Predictions other than for DESKSCORE according to Deis and Giroux (1996, 69) model. 
2Significant at the *.10 level; **.05 level; ***.01 level 
 
 
QCRSCORE = 20+ 21SIZE + 22WEALTH + 23CLIENTS + 24OFFICES + 25PEER + 26TIME + 27HOURS 
+ 28YEAR1 + 21HOURS + 22DESKSCORE + 21 
 
HOURS = 30 + 31SIZE + 32PCI + 33CAFR + 34ICREPORTS + 35OPIN + 36YEAR1 + 31DESKSCORE + 
32QCRSCORE + 31 
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Table 9 Three-Stage Least Squares Simultaneous Equations Model of Audit Service Supply 
 
Dependent 
Variable: 
DESKSCORE QCRSCORE HOURS 
Variable Regression 
Coefficient 
T-statistic1 Regression 
Coefficient 
T-statistic1 Regression 
Coefficient 
T-statistic1 
       
INTERCEPT 1.202 5.043*** -2.953 -5.617*** 4.122 3.966*** 
SIZE 0.117 4.142*** -0.286 -4.386*** 0.354 9.021*** 
WEALTH 0.007 0.399 -0.014 -0.382 na na 
PCI na na na na -0.063 -0.426 
CLIENTS 0.002 0.574 -0.006 -0.585 na na 
OFFICES 0.001 0.052 -0.001 -0.042 na na 
CAFR -0.001 -0.115 na na 0.071 0.744 
ICREPORT na na na na 0.052 0.535 
OPIN na na na na 0.045 0.426 
PEER 0.008 0.277 -0.019 -0.314 na na 
TIME -0.000 -0.117 0.000 0.162 na na 
YEAR1 -0.136 -2.070** 0.329 2.053** -0.271 -1.002 
Endogenous 
Variables: 
      
HOURS -0.315 -4.181*** 0.769 4.572*** na na 
QCRSCORE 0.412 9.970*** na na 1.155 4.258*** 
DESKSCORE na na 2.429 8.958*** -2.194 -1.749** 
1Significant at the *.10 level; **.05 level; ***.01 level 
na: not applicable 
 
 
The results are generally similar to the OLS results except that all three propositions were upheld with 
slightly stronger results. In the two audit quality models the endogenous variables DESKSCORE and QCRSCORE 
are significant and positively associated with one another. Audit hours, however, is positively associated with 
QCRSCORE but negatively associated with DESKSCORE. This is the same as the OLS result. In the audit hours 
model QCRSCORE is significant and positively associated with HOURS while DESKSCORE is significant and 
negatively associated with HOURS. This is likely driven by the “window dressing” phenomena noted in the 
discussion of Figure 1.  
 
Conclusions 
 
This study investigated ex-post measurements of audit quality in the public sector. The results suggest that 
desk reviews differ from QCRs in significant ways. Two variables that significantly affect desk review score are the 
number of ISD clients and the year of the audit (i.e., initial versus continuing audit engagements). The findings 
indicate that initial audits produce lower desk review scores (more deficiencies), and auditors with more ISD clients 
receive higher desk review scores (fewer deficiencies). These results can be explained by a new interpretation of 
desk review scores. Desk reviews may capture the industry/client specific knowledge of the auditor. Finally, because 
the number of ISD clients and DESKSCORE are not highly correlated, it appears that these two variables measure 
different forms of industry/client specific knowledge. 
 
 The study also finds that desk review score is not a significant predictor of audit hours. Prior research 
indicated that measures of audit quality based on desk reviews were associated with auditor labor (O‟Keefe et al. 
1994). Our paper is the first research, however, to use a direct measure of labor (i.e., audit hours) to test this theory. 
Further, this is the first study to directly compare desk review scores with established and accepted measures of 
public-sector audit quality. We find that desk review scores are not related to audit hours and do not measure the 
audit quality characteristics captured by quality control reviews. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research                                                                               Volume 2, Number 1 
 95 
 It is critical for regulators to learn if QCRs are redundant measures of audit quality, or if they provide 
valuable information not revealed by desk reviews.  Many audits in the public sector are of low quality and fail to 
comply with GAAS (US GAO 1986). As a result, some type of formal review process is necessary to promote 
quality financial reporting by governmental units. The TEA and other school districts could significantly reduce 
public spending if performing only desk reviews would accomplish the monitoring goals set by the Department of 
Education.  This research indicates that desk reviews only capture one aspect of the quality of audit services.  
Further, study of the indicators of audit service quality in the public sector begins to speak to recent problems with 
consumer confidence in private sector audit quality.  Detailed reviews of working paper evidence can unveil 
substandard audits that use “window dressing” techniques to conceal their deficiencies. 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
The study has limitations related to the database used. QCR results, documented in the three Texas school 
district studies, were based on a database of audits conducted in 1986 and 1987. Given the comparison goals of this 
study, the same database was used with the addition of the desk review measure. While we believe that this data can 
still improve our understanding of audit quality constructs, we must acknowledge that using older data has some 
limitations. Also, it is possible that the desk review process in Texas differs from the process used in other states. 
Before results can be generalized to a nationwide population of school districts, QCRs should be compared to desk 
reviews for school districts of other states. A further limitation is the scoring method used to develop the 
DESKSCORE metric. Although the scoring method was rigorous and based on TEA guidelines, any weighted 
scoring procedure is subjective in nature. 
 
 As the results indicate, desk reviews and QCRs measure very different constructs. We must investigate 
whether or not it is beneficial for regulators to provide desk reviews for all school districts and QCRs only on a 
limited basis. Future research could focus on the particular aspects of auditor expertise captured by the desk review 
process. In addition, if desk review procedures simply indicate industry specific knowledge of the auditor, we must 
determine if the desk review process is beneficial. If desk reviews can be replaced by checking specific auditor 
qualifications, will Texas need to implement QCR programs for all school districts? 
 
References 
 
1. Colbert, G., and T. O‟Keefe. 1995. Compliance with GAAS reporting standards: Evidence from a positive 
enforcement program. Auditing: A Journal of Practice & Theory 14 (Fall): 1-16. 
2. Copley, P., M. Doucet, and K.M. Gaver. 1994. A simultaneous equations analysis of quality control review 
outcomes and engagement fees for audits of recipients of federal financial assistance. The Accounting 
Review 69 (January): 244-256.  
3. DeAngelo, L. 1981a. Auditor independence, „Low Balling,‟ and disclosure regulation. Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 3 (2): 113-127. 
4. __________. 1981b. Auditor size and quality. Journal of Accounting and Economics 3 (4): 183-199. 
5. Deis, D., and G. Giroux. 1992. Determinants of audit quality in the public sector. The Accounting Review 
67(3): 462-479. 
6. __________. 1996. The effect of auditor changes on audit fees, audit hours, and audit quality. Journal of 
Accounting and Public Policy 15(1): 55-76. 
7. __________, and T. Canby. 1990. Auditing the auditors. Today’s CPA 16(3): 36-39. 
8. Francis, J., and D. Simon. 1987. A test of audit pricing in the small-client segment of the U.S. audit market. 
The Accounting Review 62(1): 145-57. 
9. Giroux, G., D. Deis, and B. Bryan. 1995. The effect of peer review on audit economics. Research in 
Accounting Regulation 9: 63-82. 
10. Nichols, D., and K. Price. 1976. The auditor-firm conflict: An analysis using concepts of exchange theory. 
The Accounting Review 51(2): 335-46. 
11. O‟Keefe, T., R. King, and K. Gaver. 1994. Audit fees, industry specialization, and compliance with GAAS 
reporting standards. Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 13(2): 41-55. 
Journal of Business & Economics Research                                                                               Volume 2, Number 1 
 96 
12. O‟Keefe, T., and P. Westort. 1992. Conformance to GAAS reporting standards in municipal audits and the 
economics of auditing. Research in Accounting Regulation 6 (1992): 39-77. 
13. Pachelle, M., and E. MacDonald. 1999. Ernst & Young woes continue despite Cendant settlement. The Wall 
Street Journal Interactive Edition (December 20). 
14. Rubin, M. 1988. Municipal audit fee determinants. The Accounting Review 63(2): 219-236. 
15. Shockley, R. 1982. Perceptions of audit independence: A conceptual model. Journal of Accounting, 
Auditing, and Finance 5: 126-143. 
16. Simon, D., and J. Francis. 1988. The effects of auditor change on audit fees: Tests of price cutting and price 
recovery. The Accounting Review 63 (2): 255-269. 
17. Texas Education Agency. 1994a. Audit Review Manual. Austin, TX. 
18. __________. 1994b. Checklist for Internal Review. Austin, TX. 
19. Turpen, R. 1990. Differential pricing on auditor‟s initial engagements: Further evidence. Auditing: A 
Journal of Practice and Theory 9 (Spring): 60-76. 
20. United States General Accounting Office. 1986. CPA Audit Quality: Governmental Audits Do Not Comply 
with Professional Standards. Washington, D.C.: GAO. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1
 One of the objectives of both desk reviews and working paper reviews is to decide whether the auditor‟s work is 
acceptable or unacceptable (i.e., substandard). This is commonly referred to as the “outcome” of the review process. 
Several studies have used the outcome of the review, rather than the underlying detail, to proxy for audit quality. 
Colbert and O‟Keefe (1995) and O‟Keefe and Westort (1992) use the outcome of desk reviews conducted by the 
Oregon State Board of Public Accountancy. Copley et al. (1994) use the outcome of working paper reviews 
conducted by Offices of Regional Inspector‟s General. A dichotomous dependent variable is used in each of these 
studies to indicate acceptable versus unacceptable outcomes.   
2
 Deis and Giroux (1992) also assigned different weights to major and minor deficiencies in quality control reviews. 
Results of the current study are robust with multiple weight assignments. 
3
 Diagnostic measures were performed for all models. Variance inflation factors were all below 2, indicating few 
problems with multicollinearity. Residual plots indicated that residuals were normally distributed for all models. 
Plots of residuals versus predicted values were analyzed to check for constant variances. All models had 
homoskedastic errors after applying log transformations to some variables. Whites Specification Test also indicated 
that the residual terms were homoscedastic. 
4
 To verify that the non-significant results for Audit hours were not the result of differences between our limited 
sample of 181 school districts and the full sample of 232 school districts investigated by Deis and Giroux (1996), we 
re-estimated the Deis and Giroux model for audit quality using our limited sample. Results were unchanged from 
their original study. Audit hours had a positive and significant effect on audit quality as measured by QCRSCORE. 
 
